Water in Israel: The Dry Facts by Martin Sherman with comments by IceViking after
- - - - by IceViking
"A. Introduction - An Overview of the Study
In recent years the water problem in Israel has been increasingly thrust onto the public agenda. Up until the early '80s, debate on the subject was largely confined to professional hydrological and engineering circles. However, as the severity of the problem increased, it slowly began to attract the attention of ever-widening audiences. It is now common to find the topic debated in the media and academia not only in abstruse "hydro-technical" terms, but also in the wider context of the implications for the nation's strategic posture, the administration of its public policy and the conduct of its international relations.
This wider debate and growing public awareness is highly appropriate, albeit somewhat overdue. For today the Israeli water system is faced with daunting challenges of unprecedented severity, many of which can be traced to years of administrative (rather than professional) shortsightedness, arrogance and incompetence. In a special report on the State of Israel's water system written in 1990, the State Comptroller asserted that:
... the manner in which the water system has been managed over a long period is what caused it to degenerate into its present very difficult situation. The [current] predicament is not a result of an act of God or of one or even two successive years of drought, but of imprudent management over years.[1]
(For a particularly scathing indictment of the administration of the water system - see Zaslavsky, 1997, pp. 14-20; Zaslavsky, 2000, pp. 11.[2]) It is thus distinctly plausible that had the management of national water resources been subject to greater public scrutiny, much of the severity of the present "hydro-predicament" facing the nation may have been avoided - or at least attenuated.
Against this backdrop of growing scarcity, a net assessment of Israel's hydro-strategic position and a judicious evaluation of its future policy options and imperatives, is both timely and necessary. Indeed, in many ways Levi Eshkol's remark several decades ago, that water, more than anything else, is likely to be the "limiting factor on [the nation's] development" is more pertinent than ever.[3]
The ensuing analysis of the national water problem will be structured in the following manner:
I commence with a definition of the problem, both in terms of its inherent geo-climatic origins, and in terms of its scope and severity, underscoring the growing imbalance between available natural supplies and increasing demand, much of which is largely inelastic (i.e., demand largely insensitive to price changes). Next I review in greater detail the state of the various natural sources, where the problem of the dwindling quantity of available water is exacerbated by a further (and often causally related) phenomenon of deteriorating water quality.
Subsequently, I broach the thorny hydro-political aspects of the problem. For the future of the national water system is heavily dependant on the final outcome of the peace initiatives between Israel and its Arab neighbors, particularly Syria and the Palestinians. Indeed, whatever one's political predilections may be, one hydrological implication is inescapable. If Israel implements the withdrawals from the Golan and Judea and Samaria implicit in the agreements discussed with Damascus and the Palestinian Authority, it will lose control over the fate of a very significant portion of the water supplies currently utilized by it - according to some estimates up to 65% of the currently available amounts. This significant, and possibly provocative, assertion will be explicated and substantiated in subsequent sections of this study. At this stage it will suffice to make the point that the structure and operation of the national water system in the new millennium will be radically affected in virtually all aspects, including the siting of installations and their energy requirements, the nature of supply sources and the configuration of conveyance networks, depending on whether or not Israel maintains effective control over the water sources in the Golan and Judea and Samaria.
Finally, I conclude the study with a policy-oriented analysis. In it I attempt to assess what Israel's hydro-strategic options and imperatives are, based on the prevailing hydrological and geo-political realities that face the country, and the likely interaction between them.
Note: Throughout this study I use the abbreviations "cm" and "mcm" to denote "cubic meters" and "million cubic meters" respectively."
In recent years the water problem in Israel has been increasingly thrust onto the public agenda. Up until the early '80s, debate on the subject was largely confined to professional hydrological and engineering circles. However, as the severity of the problem increased, it slowly began to attract the attention of ever-widening audiences. It is now common to find the topic debated in the media and academia not only in abstruse "hydro-technical" terms, but also in the wider context of the implications for the nation's strategic posture, the administration of its public policy and the conduct of its international relations.
This wider debate and growing public awareness is highly appropriate, albeit somewhat overdue. For today the Israeli water system is faced with daunting challenges of unprecedented severity, many of which can be traced to years of administrative (rather than professional) shortsightedness, arrogance and incompetence. In a special report on the State of Israel's water system written in 1990, the State Comptroller asserted that:
... the manner in which the water system has been managed over a long period is what caused it to degenerate into its present very difficult situation. The [current] predicament is not a result of an act of God or of one or even two successive years of drought, but of imprudent management over years.[1]
(For a particularly scathing indictment of the administration of the water system - see Zaslavsky, 1997, pp. 14-20; Zaslavsky, 2000, pp. 11.[2]) It is thus distinctly plausible that had the management of national water resources been subject to greater public scrutiny, much of the severity of the present "hydro-predicament" facing the nation may have been avoided - or at least attenuated.
Against this backdrop of growing scarcity, a net assessment of Israel's hydro-strategic position and a judicious evaluation of its future policy options and imperatives, is both timely and necessary. Indeed, in many ways Levi Eshkol's remark several decades ago, that water, more than anything else, is likely to be the "limiting factor on [the nation's] development" is more pertinent than ever.[3]
The ensuing analysis of the national water problem will be structured in the following manner:
I commence with a definition of the problem, both in terms of its inherent geo-climatic origins, and in terms of its scope and severity, underscoring the growing imbalance between available natural supplies and increasing demand, much of which is largely inelastic (i.e., demand largely insensitive to price changes). Next I review in greater detail the state of the various natural sources, where the problem of the dwindling quantity of available water is exacerbated by a further (and often causally related) phenomenon of deteriorating water quality.
Subsequently, I broach the thorny hydro-political aspects of the problem. For the future of the national water system is heavily dependant on the final outcome of the peace initiatives between Israel and its Arab neighbors, particularly Syria and the Palestinians. Indeed, whatever one's political predilections may be, one hydrological implication is inescapable. If Israel implements the withdrawals from the Golan and Judea and Samaria implicit in the agreements discussed with Damascus and the Palestinian Authority, it will lose control over the fate of a very significant portion of the water supplies currently utilized by it - according to some estimates up to 65% of the currently available amounts. This significant, and possibly provocative, assertion will be explicated and substantiated in subsequent sections of this study. At this stage it will suffice to make the point that the structure and operation of the national water system in the new millennium will be radically affected in virtually all aspects, including the siting of installations and their energy requirements, the nature of supply sources and the configuration of conveyance networks, depending on whether or not Israel maintains effective control over the water sources in the Golan and Judea and Samaria.
Finally, I conclude the study with a policy-oriented analysis. In it I attempt to assess what Israel's hydro-strategic options and imperatives are, based on the prevailing hydrological and geo-political realities that face the country, and the likely interaction between them.
Note: Throughout this study I use the abbreviations "cm" and "mcm" to denote "cubic meters" and "million cubic meters" respectively."